A month ago I composed a brief survey of my semantic identification upon concepts in the world of complexity - as I see it. It was published on the discussion list of the New England Complex Systems Institute (NECSI) as follows (with some minor editing of text-parts for this essay). The publication:
From: J A MIKES <ami_kes@PRODIGY.COM>
To: NECSI@HOME.EASE.LSOFT.COM
Date: Sun, 16 May 1999 17:20:20 -0500
Subject: Re: 2 meanings of emergence
Dear Complexifiers!
(Body): This is a late reflection to the April 26-27 exchange between Brian (Josephson) and Don (Mikulecky), concerning the definition(s) of complexity.
There were 'models' involved, different types of them, 'particles' forming systems, etc. I think Occam has to be invoked. I mean: the ultimate Occam, when his razor not only cuts the details, but substitutes the ,complicated, by a ,simplified, solution (as well).
Let me try in a 'common sense' fashion.
Complexity is an assemblage of components, the Aristotelian total, in which the 'sum' of the components is different from the 'total', as he said: the total is 'more' than this sum. I prefer: 'different', because qualia are involved. What are we speaking about? About a composition, an ensemble, a group-unit, which can be dissected into its components/ingredients by reductionist analysis. There is for sure one "difference": the existence of the ensemble's group-quale vs. the (additive?) qualia of a bunch of ingredients per se.
Now this difference can be anything, in most cases it is unpredictable, as far as quantities and qualitative changes are concerned. Usually such conditions are called: nonlinear, used here in an extended sense, more than the mathematical chapter of higher order or self-referential functions.
1./ ANYTHING, be it a material (physical) construct, a function (physical or mental), an ideation (perceptive or thought item).
2./ EVERYTHING in the world which is observable and analytically dissectable into components.
In brief: the world consists of complexities, no matter which part or segment we pick or identify. Even our axioms, quarks, fundamental basics are compositions of ingredients, even if below, or above our actual sensing capabilities. The limits of such capabilities change constantly, they expand during the course of our epistemic evolution.
Every ensemble has qualia of the group-unit, mostly unpredictable from the ingredients without retrospect (hindsight), starting from the already observed group-characteristics.
As Brian Josephson perfectly observed:
> >
> > Complexity is the property of a real world system that is manifest in the inability of any
> > one formalism being adequate to capture all its properties.
> > Brian
> >
I would add: and everything in this world is such. Formalism is linear (cf: mathematics, dealing in proportional quantities and consequent qualities).
Don Mikulecky also expressed the right position (however 'segmented'):
>
>What are the two classes of models? Simple mechanisms and complex systems.
>What are simple mechanisms? Anything successfully modeled by the Newtonian Paradigm.
>What are complex systems? ALL REAL SYSTEMS ARE COMPLEX.
>
'Models' are also complex systems, however different from the original complexity they serve as models for. An emergent is part of the "total", eo ipso a (partial) model CANNOT and does not carry the 'total' of the original complexity: it carries its own emergent, which may be an aspect of the total to be modeled. As long as we do not susbtitute (mistake) the model for the total, we may successfully use them. As long as the model is made in a way to perform in a predesigned predictable (linear) manner, it itself is linear (a machine), like AI or a computer.
As for 'Real Systems'? even Virtual Reality may contain complexities.
The challenge is in finding the way of the complexity-formation, the rules of the build-up, the tectology of the world, starting with: how the first force-particle "linearized" from the primordial soup, or how the CAS of a stock market reacts upon an occurrence in the marketplace: it has to include the discovery of a nonproportional (mathematical?) logic, and a causality where cause and effect are not conform in quality (in our present terms). This is frequently called - "chaotic" - nowadays: as in deterministic chaos. Only if we learned how to think in these lines can we predict the group-qualia in an assemblage. Of course it will loose the quality of an 'emergence', as defined currently: "the unpredictable" NEW, in an understood (discovered) 'tectological' way that leads to the present, only observable "givens" in nature.
(signed: John Mikes )
My scientific schizophrenia started to argue with the above position: is it really "all inclusive"? Is the "actual limitation" of our epistemic understanding a general enough criterion in setting standards for a genereal scientific distinction? What if we set those limitations at 1000AD and deem a car a complexity with "unpredictable" (chaotic) emergent? What if we detect some tectological rules and resolve in some cases the emergent - which now place those same assemblages into the defined "complexity" term? Is it right to distinguish sharply between "complexity" and (the linear?) "complex" (as in convoluted, complicated, intricate, entangled)?
It seems we have two aspects of ensembles, built from components into units: one is deemed 'linear', following quantitative proportionality and qualitative consequence of our present logic, the other defies them. (I try not to use the unidentified term 'chaotic' anymore, since "chaos" is a noumenon for encompassing the "so far" undiscovered ways of nature).
In which case we have linear complexities, (I called them: "simple", no matter how complicated they may be), which comply with mathematical tratment and ordinary causality and the (nonlinear) "complexities" with their 'unpredictable' emergents. Since the ambient folk-semantics favors the first kind, we better find a new name for the second one. - (I will call this group "complexity II" until we find and agree in its new name).
This proposal would establish the peace: all quantitative treatments for complexities have full validity (within the linearly-deemed complex systems), while we may still seek further, new understanding in cases of the unpredictable (as of today) assemblages.
We may contimue the peace-treaty: complexities (I?) can consist of components, which are complexity II constructs and vice versa. Such allowance facilitates the acceptance of models: once treatment and conclusion do not go beyond the linear-domain, they are fully relevant.
This is a "first thought" on modifying the earlier ideas. I believe it is a step ahead.
Then again everything is a step ahead until it is refuted.
John Mikes, Madison NJ