To Dovie's family, her husband Don, children Mike, and Karen, her 4 grandchildren, 3 great grandchildren, her mother Cordie, sisters Vicki and Sheri, and brothers Johnnie Jr. Don, and Wayne, we offer our deepest sympathy. We can only imagine how much they will miss her, because we know how much we will miss her.

Cards may be sent to: The Family of Dovie Widner Huffman, c/o Vickie Gannon, P.O. Box 1031, Graham, TX 76450.

In Lieu of Flowers, Dovie requested that donations be made to the National Alliance of Families at P.O. Box 40327, Bellevue WA. 98015.

"US Fighting Losing Battle To Find Live MIAs In Asia: Official" so read the headline of an Agence France - Presse article dated August 15th. The article, filed in Phnom Penh states: "The United States admitted Tuesday it had no credible evidence any of the thousands of young American soldiers who went missing in action (MIA) during wars in Asia are still alive."

"US deputy assistant secretary of defense Robert Jones, responsible for tracking down MIAs and prisoners of war, said of the 21,000 reports of live sightings since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 none had borne fruit."

"It is highly improbable that there is an American being held against their will," he told reporters before wrapping up a tour of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. "Does that rule out the possibility? No it does not, and that is the reason the president of the United States has as his number one priority the investigation of live sighting reports," he said."

"There are currently 2,014 American soldiers unaccounted for in Southeast Asia alone. The last report of a live sighting was last year, Jones said, but declined to give details. Washington spends about 54 million dollars a year world-wide trying to track down and identify the remains of missing soldiers."

"Jones said defectors from North Korea had also given investigators no hard evidence there were any survivors of the war on the Korean peninsula still being held by Pyongyang. "We have debriefed over 485 defectors that have come from the North to the South. None of them have been able to provide us with any information concerning live Americans in North Korea."

"Jones said that the only credible reports received related to four defectors who went over to the North between 1960 and 1980, and are now residing in the North and considered by Pyongyang to be naturalized North Korean citizens."

"The two Korea -- with the South backed by the US -- have remained technically at war following the bitter 1950-53 conflict. No peace treaty was signed between the two nations after the war ended in an uneasy armistice. Jones said that should hostilities end on the peninsula, where the US still bases some 37,000 troops, it would be up to those four defectors if they wanted to reestablish contact with their families."

"He said after the Vietnam conflict he knew of only two US soldiers who chose to stay behind, one of whom was now dead. The other, a marine, later returned to the US and was court-martialed and discharged."

Who Is He Kidding - The investigation of Live Sightings doesn't even come close to being Bill Clinton's "number one priority." If Washington is spending approximately "54 million dollars a year world-wide trying to track down and identify the remains of missing," we'd like to know how much of that actually goes to identifying remains because they sure aren't getting their monies worth. This begs the question:

Why Does Johnnie Webb Still Have A Job.

"It is highly improbable that there is an American being held against their will," so says Robert L. Jones, head of the Defense POW/MIA office. The article goes even further stating: "The United States admitted Tuesday it had no credible evidence any of the thousands of young American soldiers who went missing in action (MIA) during wars in Asia are still alive."

Does Mr. Jones know something he has failed to share with the POW/MIA families? Does he now have incontrovertible proof that Charles Shelton, David Hrdlick, John Mc Donnell and other Americans known to be in captivity are dead? Until such proof is produced, the presumption of life must go to the POW. The fact that Mr. Jones made these comments, while in Southeast Asia, makes them doubly reprehensible.

This comment ranks with Senator John Kerry's comments during the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs when he stated "Vietnam would be a pariah among nations" should they now return American POWs. We don't know who instructs Mr. Jones, but whom ever it is should know you don't negotiate working from a negative position. They should know you don't ask for something and then state your belief that you don't think what your asking for exists.

The National Alliance of Families strongly believes that American Servicemen, from the Vietnam War, Korean War, Cold War, and possibly World War II, survive today on foreign soil. This belief is reinforced by the recent release of South Korean POWs held by North Korea, Japanese POWs held by the Soviets since World War II and most recently an Hungarian captured in 1944 by the Soviets and released in August 2000. If these men survived, why is it so hard for DPMO and other government officials to believe that Americans could also survive.

Some of the nations holding these men, may call them "survivors," "naturalized citizens," or "stateless persons." We call them husbands, fathers, brothers and sons and for an official of the Defense POW/MIA Office to state: "It is highly improbable that there is an American being held against their will," when he has no evidence of that fact, is irresponsible.

We, at the National Alliance of Families, firmly believe it is HIGHLY PROBABLE that there are Americans held against their will on foreign soil. All the evidence points to that conclusion.

Can we, at the National Alliance of Families, prove without doubt that American POWs are alive as we type this. The answer is no. However, based on evidence a high probability exists for the survival of American servicemen.

We can state, without doubt, that there is no proof that all Americans who were unaccounted for at the end of the Vietnam, and Korean/Cold War are dead. Mr. Jones knows this.

IF, and this is a huge IF there are no POWs alive today, it is not because they all died, in Vietnam prior to 1973 or in the Korean War prior to 1953. IF, and again this is a huge IF there are no POWs alive today, it is because men like Mr. Jones, his counterparts at DIA, CIA and NSA and their predecessors, going back to 1953, failed miserably at their jobs.

Glaring Failure - One of the most glaring failures of this nation's attempt to recover American POWs, involved a Lao Prison Camp, known as Nhommarath. We admit, we know very little about the events surrounding the planned rescue of POWs believed held at Nhommarath in 1981. The reason for this is that the vast majority of the intelligence regarding the planned rescue remains classified.

We did locate one interesting document. It is a memo on Defense Intelligence Agency letterhead, directed to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, written 28 January 1981, and signed by Lt. General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr. USAF. (For Full Text of the Memo Click Here.) The memo states, in part: "Since April 1979, DIA has been investigating information provided by a refugee who alleged the detention of U.S. PWs in Laos. In November 1980, CIA provided information which corroborates the refugee's report. Overhead imagery has verified the existence of a detention facility at the alleged site. At the enclosure is a chronological listing with tabs, which support the belief that U.S. PWs may be detained in Laos."

The memo continued: "On 17 January 1981, DIA requested that CIA attempt to confirm the presence of U.S. PWs in Laos. The details of the CIA intentions are contained in the enclosure. As the possibility exists that CIA could confirm these reports, I recommend that you consider preparing a contingency plan in the event this very important undertaking proves successful. To support this effort, I will request that CIA prepare a topographical model of the site and surrounding area."

The "Chronological Listing" referred to in the Tighe memo states, in part:

1. On 17 Apr. 1979, a Lao-refugee wrote a letter to Gen Vang Pao in Montana which contained. U.S. POW information. He indicated that 18 U.S. PWs and 25 Lao Prisoners were detained in a cave near Muong Nhommarath, Khammouane Province (due east of NKP Thailand). The prisoners were reportedly moved to this location from northern Laos on 10 March 1979.

2. During subsequent DoD interviews (Oct 79 and Feb 80), the refugee reported that the above PWs, and a separate group consisting of two U.S. PWs, one Australian, and one Japanese were held in caves in the vicinity of Kham Keut, approximately 70kms from Nhommarath. He provided a sketch of the detention area. One month after his initial DoD interview, the refugee reported to a Lao associate the detention of U.S. PWs at Muong Nhommarath.

3. ( Redacted ) Imagery from July 1979 indicated that a cave entrance is located approximately 500 meters from the location at which the two U.S. PWs, the Japanese and the Australian were reportedly detained. A cave entrance could not be located at the location at which the 18 U.S. PWs were reportedly detained. However, heavy foliage in that area offers the possibility that the cave entrance could exist but was obscured.

4. During September/October 1980, the refugee was re-interviewed and Polygraphed. The examiner opined that he was reporting information which he believed to be accurate and that he had not conspired with any person to provide false information. The refugee identified the source of his PW information to be a Lao resistance fighter. Efforts to locate the resistance fighter are ongoing.

5. On 18 November 1980, CIA reported (TAB A) that it had received information concerning the alleged detention of 30 U.S. PWs at Muong Nhommarath. The information was received from a highly reliable Thai source who had received it from an untested Lao subsource. On 21 January 1981, CIA reported that the Lao sub-source advised that U.S. PWs had been moved from Nhommarath to Kontum, Vietnam. Additional information is being sought.

6. Imagery (TAB 8) from 10 December 1980 indicates the presence of a detention facility at a location southeast of Muong Nhommarath. Imagery indicates this facility did not exist in April 1978 (TAB C) and was partially completed by September 1979 (TAB D). Further, examination of imagery from 10 and 30 December 1980, and 2 January 1981 reveals that the number "52" has been stamped in the dirt in the row crop area located between the camp inner and outer fencing, in a location not apparently observable from either of the two guard towers (TAB E). Imagery of 30 December 1980 indicates the presence of approximately 25 persons

in the inner compound and imagery of 24 January 1981 indicates the presence of nine (9) probable persons, 4 in the inner compound and five in the outer compound (Tab F).

7. On 17 January 1981, DIA requested that CIA conduct an operation inside Laos in an attempt to verify the presence of U.S. PWs at this facility. CIA has agreed to undertake this operation, and is currently in the planning stage.

At the same time General Tighe was writing his memo, detailing CIA and DIA actions, the State Department had already written their "Contingency Plans for Live Americans in Indochina." (For full text of the memo, click here.) In fact, the State Department Plan was date 27 January 1981, one day before the Tighe Memo. Readers of "Bits" may be familiar with this plan. We've written about it before. It was in this plan that the State Department declared action would be considered, "...Under extraordinary circumstances, in which the number of POWs was large and our information was beyond question [redacted ] action could be considered. "

The memo also stated, in part "If reliable, substantiated information reaches the USG that Americans

are being held prisoner in Indochina, the following steps will be considered, in light of prevailing circumstances:

--- immediate coordination among concerned branches of the USG;

---develop public affairs position;

--- seek greater intelligence on identity, location and condition of POWs;

---initiate reception/repatriation plan;

---diplomatic contact with the relevant government: requesting immediate release of the prisoners;

---advise relatives if identities are known. Depending on developments resulting from the above steps, further

action which might be considered include;

---further contacts with relevant government;

---contact with ICRC or other international body, requesting they visit prison site and contact prisoners;

---contact third governments for assistance;

---advise other governments of our information and intended actions;

---consider further public affairs aspects of issue.

If the Indochina Government continues to refuse to acknowledge it holds an American, several additional steps can be taken, depending on the country involved, the number of persons held prisoner, the firmness of

our information, their location, and many other factors. "

We've Often Asked - Under what circumstances would the State Department would consider a number in which "the number of POWs was large." We have our answer and 18, even 30 isn't it.

What Happened Next - We don't know. Rumor has mixed with fact and the documents remains classified. The "52" symbol picked up by satellite imagery has been hotly debated. Of the "52" symbol seen outside the facility at Nhommarath, The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, wrote; "DIA now contends that the "52" , possible "K" seen at Nhom Marrott is the result of shadowing and in no way represents a pilot distress symbol. The Committee notes, however that DIA had earlier discounted the possibility that the symbol was caused by shadowing because of the constant shape of the figures over a period of days and at different time of the day. In fact, the intelligence community had concluded in 1980 that this symbol had been dug into the ground intentionally." (Greenbook pages 25 & 26)

The Committee again mentions the DIA flip-flop on the "52" symbol on page 216 of the report stating: "The Committee further notes the inconsistency between past and present DIA analysis on the "52 possible K" symbol a detention camp in Laos."

Turn It, Twist It, Distort It, Lie About It - That's what the Alphabet Soup Gang (DMPO, DIA, CIA, NSA,) does. They do anything they can to discount creditable evidence that POWs survived after 1973. The preconceived conclusion, in 1991, had to be there were no POWs at Nhommarath, so DIA changed their reporting on the "52" symbol. A report creditable in 1980 and 1981 was deemed not creditable in 1991. What changed between 1981 and 1991?

To view drawing release by the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, click here

On October 17th, 1994 Time Magazine did a story titled "Southeast Asia: Americans Left Behind" by Douglas Waller. That article discussed the failed attempt at Nhommarath. The article stated, in part: "... TIME was piecing together the tale of the one attempt the U.S. made after the war to rescue American prisoners. The bare outlines of that 1981 plan have appeared in occasional press stories over the years. The CIA still refuses to discuss the case. Pentagon officials today say the Defense Department never had reliable intelligence on whether Americans were still alive. But here is a full report of that abortive effort, as uncovered in government documents and more than 20 interviews with military, intelligence and Reagan Administration officials involved in the rescue planning: "

"W/1" was one of the most sensitive sources the CIA ever developed in Laos: an elderly woman with close ties to the communist leadership in the capital of Vientiane. Only a handful of senior officials in Washington were privy to her information. According to CIA documents, on Nov. 14, 1980, W/1 gave her CIA handlers a startling report: about 30 U.S. pilots were working on a road gang near the central Laotian town of Nhommarath. Those same summaries reported that a spy-satellite photo confirmed that a prison camp had recently been built near the town. Military officials on the Pentagon's Joint staff in Washington thought that some pilots shot down over Laos were being held captive and could be at the camp. Two months after receiving W/1's report, the Pentagon began preparing Operation Pocket Change, a top-secret plan to retrieve the airmen. It was the only postwar rescue the U.S. government ever considered in Southeast Asia. The leads that Americans might be at the camp "were the best we ever got," says retired Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle, the man in charge of the Defense Intelligence Agency's hunt for POWS in 1980. "

"After the war ended in 1975, reports kept trickling into the CIA's Bangkok station that Americans had been seen among the prisoners working on Laotian road and irrigation projects. In 1979 a Laotian informant for the DIA named Phimmachack claimed that 18 Americans had been moved to a cave north of Nhommarath. He identified one of them as Lieut. Colonel Paul W. Mercland, but no Mercland was listed as missing. There was, however, a Lieut. Colonel Paul W. Bannon who had been shot down over Laos in 1969. Pentagon intelligence analysts suspected Mercland was a garbled version of the word American, erroneously assumed to be the officer's last name. Phimmachack passed a polygraph test, and satellite photos analyzed in the Pentagon confirmed the cave's location. "

"That information, coupled with W/1's November report, convinced some Pentagon intelligence experts that Americans might be at the camp. On Dec. 30, according to a CIA cable from Bangkok, a Thai signal unit called Team-213 alerted the Bangkok station that it had intercepted a radio message from a top Laotian military leader ordering American POWS to be flown from the southern province of Attopu to central Laos. In the same cable, the CIA dismissed the report as fabricated, on the grounds that Team-213 was poorly trained and had not made a tape of the intercept."

"But Pentagon officers who had worked with the Thai unit considered the report an important bit of evidence. DIA documents say the National Security Agency confirmed that a plane had left Attopu on the day reported. Another CIA cable from Bangkok said the agency's source in Vientiane, W/1, had delivered a similar report: "starving" prisoners were being moved out of the province because the Laotians were worried that "foreigners" might detect them. These reports convinced the DIA's Tuttle, who had served as a naval aviator in Vietnam, that American POWS were still alive in Laos. He was also persuaded by a Dec. 30, 1980, satellite photo of the camp that showed a large "52" carved on the ground near the compound's perimeter. He thought it might mean B-52 for a bomber crew. Photo interpreters also pointed to what they believed was a "K," a standard distress signal pilots on the ground used, next to the 52. Other analysts who have seen the photo subsequently argue that the 52 was simply an accidental image, caused by shadow or vegetation. But a Feb. 23, 1981, DIA memo said satellites photographed the camp for a month, and the 52 was always visible in the same place. "

"Burned by the failure of the Desert One attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in Tehran the year before, senior military officers were in no mood to try again in Laos. But never before had photographic, electronic and human intelligence all pointed to one site where POWS might be alive. National Security Adviser Richard Allen was convinced and relayed the evidence to President Ronald Reagan. The camp was in a remote jungle, and any rescue attempt would be risky, Allen warned. But, he says, Reagan was eager to try. The CIA was ordered to provide the necessary intelligence. Spy satellites watched the camp 24 hours a day. At one point, according to a CIA source, the agency considered kidnaping a Nhommarath guard to sweat him for information but rejected the idea as too dangerous. "

"In January 1981, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the super-secret Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which oversees counter terrorist units like the Delta Force, to devise a rescue operation. Tuttle says the DIA built a tabletop-size model of the Laotian camp based on satellite photos and took it to Fort Bragg in North Carolina to help the JSOC with its planning. Members of the Delta Force say the commandos then planned to construct a full-scale mock-up in the Philippines to practice its raid; as cover, it would pretend to be a Hollywood company shooting a commando movie. The JSOC sent intelligence officers to scout a remote airstrip in Thailand, where cargo planes carrying MH-6 helicopters would land to stage the airborne assault. Officers then in the unit say the plan was to have about 40 Delta commandos swoop down on the camp, armed with machine guns, breaching charges and chain saws to cut through doors."

"But before the JSOC's Brigadier General Dick Scholtes would risk the lives of his troops, he insisted that Delta conduct its own reconnaissance to confirm that American POW's were really at Nhommarath. According to former CIA officials, the agency argued that it should carry out any ground reconnaissance since Americans would stand out in the Laotian jungle, and Washington needed to retain plausible deniability. CIA officials demanded that Laotians on their payroll carry out the mission. National Security Adviser Allen sided with the

CIA after the officials assured him there would be at least one American accompanying the team to view the target. "

"Allen now says he regrets that decision because the CIA's reconnaissance team performed poorly. No Americans were included. The team was led by a former Royal Laotian Air Force pilot with no commando experience; his main qualifications for the job seemed to be that the CIA trusted him and he was familiar with the

Nhommarath area. The team's radios were antiquated. CIA and Delta Force officials say agency staff members who went to a Chicago mountaineering shop to outfit the team with climbing equipment purchased white rope; JSOC officers sent them olive-green rope that would not be spotted in the jungle. '

"Operation Pocket Change was supposed to be one of the Pentagon's most secret missions. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to repeat the mistake made in the Desert One fiasco when senior Pentagon officials kept too many key officers in the dark. Tuttle says he was ordered by the Chiefs to expand the circle of officers informed about this operation. On March 18, members of the congressional POW task force were briefed on the Nhommarath sightings. The result was a flood of leaks to the press. Colonel Ronald Duchin, then head of the Pentagon's news division, says he had to persuade half a dozen news organizations to hold their stories until the operation was over. "

"On March 29, the 13-man CIA reconnaissance team crossed the Mekong River into Laos and almost immediately ran into trouble. According to CIA officials monitoring the team at the time, Laotian army patrols pinned it down for more than a week. One member accidentally shot himself. Another fell ill and had to be evacuated. Though Nhommarath was just 40 miles from the Thai border the team took more than a month to reach the suspect camp and finally returned safely to Thailand on May 13. A week later, say CIA documents, the agency reported to the Pentagon that the team had spent two days at the camp observing about 160 prisoners, but none were Caucasians."

"By then Duchin had learned the Washington Post was planning to print its story about the proposed rescue raid. He says he conferred with senior Pentagon officials on May 20 to see if they had any objection, and they did not. Duchin told Post editors that they could go ahead. The story, which reported that a CIA team had visited a Laotian camp but turned up nothing, appeared on May 21. Duchin sensed that senior civilian officials in the Pentagon were almost relieved that the story was out, and the CIA reconnaissance had proved nothing. "Nobody was eager to launch this operation," he recalls. The Pentagon reacted to the Post story by closing the entire operation down."

"But inside the military special-operations community, the debate continued over whether the brass had been scared off too soon. Congressional staff members looking into the aborted mission two years ago learned that the CIA team had spent only two hours actually observing the camp, not two days as the agency first reported. The team leaders quickly snapped photographs from positions at least 500 yds. from the camp's perimeter, and most turned out to be blurry; they saw none of the prisoners believed to be housed in an inner compound before they were frightened away by barking guard dogs. The entire operation, Allen now concludes "was a flat-out failure. We missed the best chance we ever had to find POWS still alive."

"Last February Laos finally let a Pentagon team into the country to inspect the Nhommarath prison. Americans in the party say nervous Laotian officials rushed them through their tour of the camp and gave them little time to read the prisoner logs. No photographs were allowed. Investigators were permitted to interview only two elderly villagers from Nhommarath who claimed they never saw POWs. The team had to report back that there was "no evidence" Americans had been held there."

Nhommarath may have been the best chance, but it's not the only chance. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Jones knows it and so do the analysts at DPMO, DIA, CIA, and NSA. They chose to ignore and discredit evidence of Live POWs, while they accept "corroborating hearsay" evidence of dead POWs.

The fight is not done. There will be other opportunities. Those opportunities will come in spite of the Governments blatant attempt to end the POW Issue, as we know it.

Hungarian POW Released From Soviet Psychiatric Hospital - Captured in 1944, Andra Tamas was transferred to Soviet Psychiatric Hospital in 1947, where he survived until his release in August 2000.

From Reuters Budapest July 31 - "A Hungarian who was held in a Russian prison camp and then transferred to a psychiatric institute will return home, after having spent 53 years in the hospital, a Hungarian psychiatrist said today. The man, Andra Tamas, about 75, was recently found in a hospital in Katyelnich, 750 miles east of Moscow. "

"A Slovakian doctor, who treated him for some other illness, recognized a few Hungarian words he said, as he can't speak Russian at all," said Andra Veer, director of Hungary's National Psychiatry and Neurology Institute. Mr. Veer recently talked to the old man. "

"Mr. Veer said Mr. Tamas had told him that he was captured and taken to the prison camp around the end of 1944. In 1947, Mr. Tamas was transferred to the psychiatric institute. "First he was a little hostile," Mr. Veer said. "But later he was glad that he'd been found." He said Mr. Tamas would return to Hungary soon."

"Glad He'd Been Found" - Talk about an understatement. So let's get this straight.... Japanese POWs held by the Russians survived into the 21st century, South Korean POWs held by the North survived and now a Hungarian POW from World War II is found alive and they want us to believe that American POWs could not have survived, to this day from World War II, Korea, the Cold War and the Vietnam War.

U.S. Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs - When did they change the name? A recent article referred to the commission as the "U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Soldiers Missing in Action." Is this a case of sloppy reporting or another attempt to remove the phrases Prisoners of War or POWs from official terminology..