A war that you don't so much fight as live
Bill Keller's op-ed piece in the 10/6 New York Times -- The 40-Year War -- puts more of my disorganized thoughts into words: ...what our commandos are undertaking there now, is one skirmish in a bigger struggle between rival ways of seeing the world...
...Whether the declared war against terror will amount to a new cold war I'm not sure. The war against Communism had a definable end, where ending terrorism is a goal without a goal line. And I wonder if we have the patience for another 40-year war. Still, President Kennedy's "long twilight struggle," a bit of inaugural poetry that has been getting a lot of replay in the past few weeks, is an instructive analogy for a war that you don't so much fight as live. ...
... If we are serious about this, it is one of those conflicts that can realign the world. Like the cold war, this one, while it lasts, will assert a gravitational pull on everything. It will determine who our friends are, revise our priorities and test the elasticity of our ideals. ...
...The new cold war will determine which foreign leaders and which issues occupy the president's attention. Adios, amigo, Vicente Fox and your campaign for more porous borders! Welcome, soul-brother Putin! The original cold war taught us a good deal about the value of allies. It gave birth to the Marshall Plan and NATO and those comforting arms-control treaties that, at least until recently, the new administration belittled as constraints on our freedom. Now the common fear of terrorism is beginning to drive us together, much as the fear of nuclear annihilation did. The new cold war has finally got us to pay our United Nations dues. ...
... Fifty years ago, in the first flush of Red panic, George Kennan, the author of the containment policy and one of the shrewdest students of the cold war, wrote a letter warning that the fear of Communism could turn us "intolerant, secretive, suspicious, cruel, and terrified of internal dissension because we have lost our own belief in ourselves and in the power of our ideals." "The worst thing that our Communists could do to us," he went on, "and the thing we have most to fear from their activities, is that we should become like them." Copies of his letter should be inserted in the orientation package for employees of the new Homeland Security Council.

Further reading:

The Clash of Civilizations?, Samuel Huntington, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993

License to kill, Bernard Lewis, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 1998

; reports and analyzes Bin Laden's fatwa (verdict, judgment) proclaiming "On that basis, and in compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims. The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim." (fatwa link via emergency.com).

Both of the above were found in a wider list furnished (for now) by Foreign Affairs.

Hunting Bin Laden: PBS "Frontline" documentary web site

updated 2001, with an OBL interview.

I'm inclined to the "clash of civilizations" view: cheering the attacks in Nablus, prevarication in Riyadh, mass opinion in Pakistan believing the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated by the Israelis*. Etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.

I think we'll be fortunate if we see a subsidence of the xenophobic, militant Wahhabist brand of Islam in our lifetimes; those of us keeping "war blogs" may want to consider an alternate title if this war settles down into a long term routine. The US would be well advised to get ahead of the curve in our dependence on Arab-world oil. I would support a nuclear energy program to this end, to "bridge" a time of price hikes after the global peak oil production is reached. I've seen that maximum oil production time estimated quite soon (around 2004 to 2008 or so) based on known reserves and current production. In the longest run, perhaps we can run our industries and cities on wind and solar as well or even instead (although I doubt it). The important thing is that we must be able to make incremental adjustments rather than paint ourselves into a costly corner; the really important thing is that our society not be at the further tender mercies of ones who celebrate or "tolerate" Bin Ladens.

* Sources: Times of London, Guardian, Peter Maass.
posted by Thomas Nephew at 1:34:00 AM -- |    

 

Back to encryption, via Staerk and Counterpane
Yesterday Matt Welch warmly recommended Bjoern Staerk's The World After WTC war blog, and he's right, it's excellent. In it, among many other things, is a 10/01/2001 link to some useful points about encryption and security in general and encryption in particular. The Counterpane 9/30/2001 article is by Bruce Schneier, one of the same people who wrote the white paper I found a few days ago.

A worthwhile (but not decisive) factual point in that article is a link to a Reuters news item (Ashcroft: FBI Probes if Other Planes Were Targeted) pointing out ""They did use it (the Internet) and they used it well,'' the official said of the e-mails of the hijackers and their associates. The FBI has been able to get e-mails that date back as far as 30 to 45 days, the official said. The official said the e-mails were in English and Arabic, that there were hundreds of communications, and the e-mails were not just limited to the United States. The hijackers did not use encryption techniques, the official said." (emphasis added).

Of course, that's what they know so far, and the gist of other security analyses I've read is to be prepared for improvements and changes in tactics. Also, regarding some of Schneier's other points, directly preventing terrorist attacks is actually not the only goal worth pursuing. Things like photo ID, even when fake, provide another avenue for post-attack investigation: where did they get it, how long and where did they use it. Terrorists may be suicidal, but they may still be deterred or at least slowed down by measures that promise to help trace their movements and find their associates.

I also remain unconvinced that my "prove you're decryptable" method faces the same objections that Schneier poses to more intrusive schemes. But Schneier appears to be an expert, which I certainly am not. For good discussions of steganography, encryption, biometrics, and security issues in general, see the Counterpane link above.

PS: I was surprised to see this weblog mentioned in the same Welch weblog article. Thank you. posted by Thomas Nephew at 10:49:00 AM -- |    

 

"I know it when I see it" is good enough for government work
Michael Kinsley's October 4 column in Slate (Defining Terrorism - It's essential. It's also impossible) does a good job of outlining the difficulties in defining terrorism in a way "that does not depend on whose ox is gored. Otherwise you are conceding that one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter." Nevertheless, I disagree with him.

First, I think Kinsley overstates the difficulties just a little bit. He does so by throwing well-chosen dust in our eyes: Hiroshima and the Contras (US as terrorists; US sponsoring terrorists). However, his arguments lose some of their force if you
(1) concede, as I do, that we were sponsoring terrorists called "Contras", and that we should not have, and
(2) deny that Hiroshima was "terrorist", because it was done by an accountable government, in furtherance of objectives (ending the even greater prospects of future bloodshed, and destroying a regime that needed destroying) its people consented to and even insisted on.

Thus I lean towards the following definition: Terrorism is violence by self-appointed individuals or organizations on behalf of some ideological cause and directed against noncombatants. When it is "merely" for financial gain, that is "merely" crime. When it is "state sponsored" or "state harbored," in that the state instigates the act or shelters those who did, the state shares responsibility, and should expect a war. When it is against combatants, it may actually be "rebellion" or "resistance." When the state is merely responsible for starting the terrorist group, but then withdraws support, it is no longer a sponsor, although it perhaps remains morally liable for the terrorists' misdeeds.

But say you read all my persuasive thoughts above, yet (incredibly) you still agree with Kinsley that terrorism is impossible to define. What Kinsley really gets away with in his piece is claiming it's essential to define terrorism in the first place. Instead, let's just define terrorists, and where they hide, on a case by case basis. Diplomatic niceties notwithstanding, everyone in the UN knows that the recent resolution was aimed at Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, everyone knows why, and everyone knows why Afghanistan is part of that equation. I suggest that this should have been made explicit and limited -- and that similar resolutions be quickly adopted about Hamas, Hezbollah, ETA, and the IRA for starters. (Of course, I won't hold my breath for that.)

Kinsley cites Potter Stewart's definition of pornography ("I know it when I see it"), but doesn't believe that is good enough for "terrorism". I do. posted by Thomas Nephew at 10:51:00 PM -- |    

 

Iraqi famine: not just Hussein's fault?
OTN explores Iraq under sanctions: why are children dying?
In contrast to the article mentioned here a few days ago (The only starving Iraqis...), this article alleges that the food and medicine shortages in Hussein's Iraq are not self-inflicted. The article's principal contentions are:

• the oil-for-food/medicine does not permit Iraq sufficient funds to feed itself: The oil-for-food programme approved in April 1995 allowed Iraq to export $2 billion worth of oil every six months, of which $1.3 billion could be spent on food and medicine, $600,000 would be put into a compensation fund to pay for claims against Iraq for war damages, and $80,000 would go towards UN expenses. But the UN estimates that Iraq needs to spend $2.1 billion on food and medicine every six months ...


• food/medicine contracts are being held up: 49 of 879 (5.5%) are delayed for reasons that are unclear.

The first point is important, if true (both in interpreting what the UN says, and in assuming the UN analysis is correct). The second point seems relatively trivial. Other points made in the same web site seem to imply that the oil-for-food program is the only possible way Iraqis can get food. Surely they have their own agriculture? Nevertheless, the argument that the allotted food shipments are insufficient per se is troubling.

posted by Thomas Nephew at 2:47:00 PM -- |    

 

Lack of intelligence
What went wrong, New Yorker article by Seymour Hersh.
The CIA has been crippled by feel-good edicts about who to recruit overseas. posted by Thomas Nephew at 2:10:00 PM -- |    

 

Real Psyops
Special soldiers cover mental terrain: USA Today reports that some predicted psychological operations in Afghanistan include leaflets similar to those I suggested a few days ago (In Memoriam): "Cultural sensitivities are crucial, Friedman says. He expects messages to appeal to Afghans' Muslim beliefs. "There will be religious leaflets taking various phrases from the Koran that speak of peace and not killing one's neighbors," he predicts. "There will be photographs of dead women and children and the question 'Is this what Allah teaches?' " They're right, leafleting is better than just adding the photos to each bomb package dropped on Taliban/Al Qaeda positions: more live people who might give a flip will be able to see the leaflets. That's why we have professionals doing this, I'd just muck things up. posted by Thomas Nephew at 2:02:00 PM -- |    

 

I'm gonna study war after all
Grüne: Wachsendes Verständnis für US-Gegenschlag - Politik - SPIEGEL ONLINE (Greens: Growing understanding for US retaliation)
It seems I was wrong, or at least, that the "Realo" wing of the Greens is stronger or more confident than I thought. Party chief Fritz Kuhn told "Die Zeit" that "the whole method of nonviolent struggle, which is based on the moral superiority of nonviolence, fails utterly in this case." Green spokesman Christian Sterzing believes that a party congress on Saturday will approve military action in keeping with international law, but not revenge or retribution..A majority considers the Greens to be a "shaping" party and not a simple "anti"party any more. Green parliamentary whip Kerstin Mueller notes that a pacifist party can not govern in Germany because of its automatic alliance responsibilities to NATO...but conflict prevention politics can be emphasized."

Fine, whatever. I'm impressed with the Greens' ability to see relatively clearly, and hope it serves as a model for Lefties here and in the UK to get on board. I'm less concerned about the fine tuning they think they can demand in the prosecution of this war. I do not want carpet bombing either, and I think it's clear that won't happen. But recalling Kosovo, even minimal civilian casualties will inevitably be inflated to the status of war crimes by many of these folks, or at least their reluctant supporters and outright opponents within the Greens. I also foresee difficulties in deciding what to do with Al Qaeda prisoners; they, or at least the ringleaders and those involved in the 9/11 attacks (and prior ones) should be tried in the United States as murderers. Actually, I'd prefer they were killed in action. posted by Thomas Nephew at 10:43:00 PM -- |    

 

The only starving Iraqis are the ones who have to put up with Saddam
TNR Online | Food Fight by Michael Rubin (published 6/18/2001). Rubin points out that there are no starving kids in the northern no-fly zone part of Iraq that Hussein doesn't dare to oppress: The difference [in northern Iraq] is that local Kurdish authorities, in conjunction with the United Nations, spend the money they get from the sale of oil. Everywhere else in Iraq, Saddam does. And when local authorities are determined to get food and medicine to their people--instead of, say, reselling these supplies to finance military spending and palace construction--the current sanctions regime works just fine. Or, to put it more bluntly, the United Nations isn't starving Saddam's people. Saddam is ... According to the U.S. State Department, in October 1999 Allied patrols in the Persian Gulf stopped three ships that were carrying food out of Iraq. (emphasis added). posted by Thomas Nephew at 2:00:00 PM -- |    

 

End reliance on foreign oil
TNR Online | Pumped Up by Gregg Easterbrook: So as the Bush administration plots the difficult and complex war against terrorism on which it has now embarked, it should add one simple and mundane element: America must reduce its consumption of Persian Gulf oil. And thereby reduce the chance that our own cash is filling terrorists' coffers.

I agree with 90% of this article, up to and including the support for increased nuclear power. I don't agree that ANWAR should be opened up to exploration, though. I do think that a bit of strategic thinking would start us subsidizing hybrid cars and alternative (wind, solar) energy sources as a hedge against oil shocks.
posted by Thomas Nephew at 1:55:00 PM -- |    

 

Wahhabist Islam: part of the problem?
At least some of its adherents, at least some of the time. Saudi Friends, Saudi Foes posted by Thomas Nephew at 1:26:00 PM -- |    

 

The end of the German Green Party?
Stern Magazin: Porträt: Joschka allein zu Haus
The Kosovo campaign left the German Green Party in disarray and decline; the 9/11 attacks threaten it with collapse. Foreign minister Fischer, a Green, is likely to (indeed, is required by NATO agreements to) support German participation of some kind in the fight against Bin Laden. But the Greens grew out of the peace and anti-NATO, anti nuclear weapons movements, as well as from environmentalist groups. A large portion of the "Basis" (ground roots) are likely to abandon their leadership -- or consider themselves abandoned -- if German troops participate in NATO actions.

The evolution of the Green Party has been a fascinating thing to watch; their demise -- either in spirit or at the polls -- has seemed unavoidable for some time. The sane "Realo" (realist) wing of the party may eventually be better off in the SPD, or -- less likely -- in some kind of confederation with the FDP. The "Fundi" (fundamentalist (!), ideologically purer) wing may prefer taking to the streets as they did in the good old bad days of Pershing missiles and Gorleben protests; it's certainly simpler and feels "cleaner" than the unavoidable compromises they must make as part of a ruling coalition. It's not clear whether they appreciate the risks for their own goals in doing so; I would foresee fairly immediate foreign policy, nuclear policy, defense policy, and immigration policy setbacks if the Greens are no longer part of the ruling coalition.

Joschka Fischer's own somewhat checkered past has recently come under scrutiny again after photos showing him participating in a 60's riot were published. Fischer weathered this scandal quite well, as this interesting (but very long!) account by Paul Berman in The New Republic -- "The Passion of Joschka Fischer" -- indicates, and Berman is right to elevate the story to a kind of morality play about the value of the "New Left" in contemporary politics. Here are Fischer's own comments about the affair in an interview with Stern Magazin. Whatever his past, Fischer played an important and admirable role during the Kosovo crisis, and may do so again as the fight against Bin Laden begins. The problem may be that Fischer is crisis-oriented; he may not have the long term patience to approach this new fight as a kind of new Cold War (not so cold, really) against militant Islam. posted by Thomas Nephew at 11:59:00 AM -- |    

 

Globalization, pro and con
Globalization opponents rose to prominence and notoriety with the "Battle in Seattle" in 2000. A similar demonstration was planned in Washington last Saturday, but shifted gears after the IMF called off its meeting here in the wake of the attacks and requests to postpone or move the meeting by local officials. No matter: anti-globalists decided to protest the coming war, and indeed some hold globalization to blame for the terrorist attacks; see for example Arundhati Roy's recent (9/29/2001) reprehensible* column in the Guardian, or TNR's Peter Beinart's observations of antiglobalization movement responses on the Internet.

Some initial readings for the defense: The Economist: Globalisation and its critics, Is globalisation doomed?, Economic man, cleaner planet. CATO Institute: Seven Moral Arguments for Free Trade (Acrobat file).

On the prosecution side, one prominent anti-globalization theorist is John Gray, author of False Dawn (read Chapter One here), reviewed unfavorably by the CATO Institute's Brink Lindsey here, by MIT's Paul Krugman here, and by Fareed Zakaria (Foreign Affairs) here. Another well-known anti-globalization book is Empire (full text here!), by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Mr. Negri is in an Italian prison for his "membership in an armed band": the Red Army, kidnappers and killers of former Italian prime minister Aldo Moro. Reviews of Empire: nutty pro, serious pro, breathless background, con (by the National Review), con (by Alan Wolfe in The New Republic).

Hardt's response to the 9/11 attack is less strident and sadder than that of say, A. Roy. In fairness, and as many amazed critics note, he and Negri point to the American Constitution as a possible model.

In other developments: a funny Tom Tomorrow cartoon, that I should keep in mind.

*It must be hard for ordinary Americans, so recently bereaved, to look up at the world with their eyes full of tears and encounter what might appear to them to be indifference. It isn't indifference. It's just augury. An absence of surprise. The tired wisdom of knowing that what goes around eventually comes around. And f**k you, too, Ms. Roy. posted by Thomas Nephew at 1:30:00 PM -- |    

 

Post 9/11 cyberpolicy
The Standard: Information Security: A New Priority The technical term for having government access to encryption keys is "key escrow." Predictably, "electronic privacy" spokespeople oppose it. As I wrote below, my mind is not made up about this, but clearly Mr. Rotenberg's is: ""Key escrow would not have prevented what took place," said Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington. "And the rush to establish Draconian security controls may do very little to provide greater safety for Americans. They would, however, provide a great cost in terms of freedom." " How great is that cost? Is there no cost worth paying? How "draconian" is key escrow, really? I would stipulate that cracking an escrow-key-encrypted message should only be done with a search warrant.

Since posting the above, I've found an online article presenting the other side: Why "backdoor" encryption requirements reduce security [PDF]. The authors prefer the more general term "key recovery." They conclude:
* Key recovery systems are inherently less secure, more costly and more difficult to use than systems without this feature.
* Deployment of a system to law enforcement specifications will require significant sacrivices in security and convenience and substantially increased costs...
* Building the secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity ... required ... is beyond the experience and current competency of the field, and may well introduce ultimately unacceptable risks and costs.

Among the problems they cite are those of betrayal of the government back-door key, and (if I skimmed this correctly) the difficulties in different countries and agencies coordinating multiple back-doors to multiple kinds of encryption. This may be true, particularly the "betrayal" objection, but I have the feeling the authors take on and defeat the most outlandish government "specifications", without acknowledging that simpler schemes (perhaps such as mine) might not be as problematic. They also seem to focus completely on the diminished value and security of encryption -- which is arguably the good their opponents seek.
posted by Thomas Nephew at 12:54:00 PM -- |    

 

Leave Reagan National Closed
(originally posted to slate, rewritten slightly here):
DCA was never a good idea; it's time to shut it down. It's too close to the Capitol, the White House, and the Pentagon. With Dulles and BWI, there is at least a fighting chance of shooting down the plane and/or evacuating these buildings and their crucial occupants. With DCA, there isn't. We'd need an absolutely foolproof security system when it may take years to come up with a halfway decent one.

Taking up some of the popular arguments against this:

Economic/job loss: While undoubtedly true that there is a temporary economic hit by losing DCA, even in the middle term, the real hit is via the decline in overall tourism. People will need to come to DC one way or the other, and will fly into Dulles or BWI, or take a train, or drive to do it. Increased traffic -- once confidence in the system is restored -- will happen for the other 2 airports, leading to new jobs at those airports.

"Terrorists win": the new all-purpose reason for doing nothing. Terrorists win if we give them low-hanging fruit like planes full of fuel a mile from the Capitol.

Convenience to Congress, the public: I think it would be a positive good to make Congresspersons as inconvenienced as the rest of us. In the long run, if convenience is truly so important, we'll build a third airport -- at a Dulles-like distance from the Capitol -- and/or a special train to it or one of the other two straight from the Capitol.

To put our country's government and military nerve centers at risk for the sake of convenience, local jobs, or misguided bravado is absurd. posted by Thomas Nephew at 11:10:00 AM -- |    

 

Cyberpolicy continued:
The new super sleuth (9/29/2001): San Jose Mercury News item on Carnivore, etc; it mentions the difficulty with encryption, and says the FBI is turning to "key-logging" -- recording keystrokes -- to capture the passwords and work around the problem that way. posted by Thomas Nephew at 10:30:00 AM -- |    

 

Thomas Friedman gets *down*
Talk Later: In which Thomas Friedman suggests Putin call the Russian Mafia to learn where Bin Laden is. Various enjoyable quotes: If Osama bin Laden were hiding in the jungles of Colombia instead of Afghanistan, whose help would we enlist to find him? U.S. Army Special Forces? The Colombian Army? I don't think so.
Actually, we would enlist the drug cartels. They have the three attributes we need: They know how to operate as a covert network and how to root out a competing network, such as Mr. bin Laden's. They can be bought and know how to buy others. And they understand that when we say we want someone "dead or alive" we mean "dead or dead."...For everything there is a season. There will be a season later on for talking... But right now — right now is the season of hunting down people who want to destroy our country. War alone may not solve this problem, but neither will social work... people have to see that we are focused, serious and ready to use whatever tactics will make the terrorists feel bad, not make us feel good...

I enjoyed reading all this, but I think the chances of Putin helping us out this way are between slim and none. But maybe everything has changed. Or maybe we'll owe him a monstrous IOU. Fine, as long as we get a *lot* of people besides Bin Laden at the same time we get him. posted by Thomas Nephew at 10:49:00 PM -- |    

 

We are stupid
An Easy Entry for Enemies (LA Times): a discussion of the easy-visa issue.
Facts:
* 1996 law required the INS to develop an automated system to track the entry and departure of all visa-holders: never implemented.
* Another provision called for an accounting of hundreds of thousands of holders of student and other temporary visas: never implemented.
*About 1,100 U.S. diplomats in more than 200 consulates and embassies worldwide have the power to issue visas. Consular officers, often junior diplomats on their first postings, face tremendous pressures, from often-desperate applicants and from superiors eager to move the line and avoid abnormally high denial rates that may offend the "host" country.
* Workload increasing: Consular offices abroad issued 7.1 million temporary visas in fiscal 2000. An additional 2.4 million applications were denied. The workload represents a 25% increase in the last decade.
* 1999 Justice Department report found that abuse of the visa waiver program (visa requirement waived for short-term visitors) "poses threats to U.S. national security."
* State Department officers now compare the name of each visa applicant with a watch list of 5.5 million who may be inadmissible for a number of reasons. Criminal histories and terrorist links may be bars to entry, but so are lack of funds, certain infectious diseases and other factors.
* There is no lookout system in place to flag missing foreign passports, though some governments may alert U.S. authorities if batches of their passports are stolen. posted by Thomas Nephew at 10:03:00 PM -- |    

 
Some issues I'm wondering about
* If we can't use Saudi air bases for this fight, why not pull out of them? I realize they may serve as bases against Iraqi aggression, but if that happens, we could just fly back in, assuming the Saudis don't crumble immediately. In the meantime, it looks like a win-win-win move: we have one less thing for Bin Laden to be mad about, the Saudis have one less thing for Bin Laden to be mad about, and Bin Laden has one less thing he feels he should be mad about (in what I hope is the very short lifespan remaining to him).

* I wonder about the Iraq grievance expressed by many in the Left. My impression is that the embargo explicitly allows for sufficient food and medicine to be imported by Iraq, and Hussein is simply starving his own people for political gain.

* Why not a moon-shot type of push for development and distribution of vaccines against germ-warfare microbes like anthrax, smallpox, etcetera? We could share the project with Europe, Japan, Russia, China, and whoever else wants in, but limit the number of laboratories involved to a highly secure few, and set up on-demand monitoring protocols by anyone including Saddam Hussein, so that trust in the project becomes possible. Make open, unannounced-inspection-participation in this the only legitimate reason for having stocks of these microbes/viruses, and the only way to get the vaccines. Make discovery of illegitimate stocks cause for an immediate state of war with the offending nation or party by all signatories.

I'm a lot more worried about this than an accidental missile launch, the only halfway reasonable reason to support missile defense. I'm also aware of the U.S.'s fairly shameful recent record on the diplomatic front regarding biological warfare. We must do better now.

* What are sensible reactions to the September 11 attacks in terms of privacy? I would support, or at least consider, measures like these:

1) make it either a criminal offense, or at least automatic probable cause for search warrants and/or surveillance, to use encryptions without keys known to US/world law enforcement agencies. Install "Carnivore"-like systems to monitor and randomly test e-mails and file transfers and TCP/IP communications in general for compliance with this international convention, as a condition of participation of an Internet server in the Internet, or at least of access to key international and United States "fat pipes". I am admittedly unclear on the technology of this, but am not willing to cede the discussion to "slash-dot" types who seem to see an inalienable right in every new technology or communications protocol that comes along. Thus, ditto for unapproved and/or unmonitorable file-sharing software such as Gnutella, and for steganography (concealing messages in graphics).

A general "pro" argument is: these means of communications exist at the discretion of the public, for the benefit of the public. Abuses of them for criminal ends should be prevented; if there are no feasible means for this other than sampling Internet traffic, so be it. People can always write a letter, make a phone call, or visit in person and attempt to evade surveillance while doing so. Broadly, the question is: should anyone have access to "unsurveillable" means of communication? Is this truly some kind of inalienable right?

2) lower standards of privacy for non US citizens, at least for future entrants to the U.S.: fingerprints of all foreign visitors to be collected and stored on entry to the US; prison terms for people using a different name than the one connected with their fingerprint-passport. Of course, we would expect similar treatment from other countries.

I feel bad about even considering some of these things, particularly (2), but I would at least like to see some sane discussion of them. The test can't simply be "this (would/would not) have stopped Atta et al," although some of it would have at least appreciably slowed them down, and would now help with establishing the "proofs" many want to see. Some kind of heightened "defense" may reduce the need for military/special forces-type "offense" in the long term: the goals of privacy and peace are to some degree at odds, particularly in this struggle, conflict, war, or whatever one chooses to call it. posted by Thomas Nephew at 5:41:00 PM -- |    

 

Bin Laden is right: the Saudis are worthless
U.S. Warns of New Attacks; Taliban Hides Bin Laden Back and forth they go: But Saudi Arabia -- a key U.S. ally and the guardian of Islam's holiest shrines -- said on Sunday it would not allow foreign forces to launch attacks against Muslim Afghanistan from its territory.

``This is out of the question,'' Interior Minister Prince Nayef told a news conference, although he did not rule out the possibility that Riyadh might allow America to use its airspace or territorial waters for some other purpose.

Let's pull out of there. If we can't use these bases for a purpose like this, why should the Saudis benefit from them either?
posted by Thomas Nephew at 3:16:00 PM -- |