Open
Meeting Law
"Personnel"
As the village board meeting opens, the mayor
asks if there is a need for an executive session. When no board
member responds, the mayor says he is in need
of an executive session. Trustee Norm Koek then makes a motion
for an executive session. New York State's Open Meeting Law
states that, when making a motion for an executive session,
trustees are required to state in their motion
the purpose of the executive session. Koek fails to identify
the purpose of the executive session in his motion. When a member
of the public asks what the purpose of the executive session
is, the mayor gets testy and red in the face, as if angry over
the question, and claims that he was just getting ready to state
the purpose. At least one observer in the audience has the distinct
impression that the mayor is making it up as he goes along.
He says the purpose of the executive session is to discuss "personnel".
State law requires that the person who makes the motion for
an executive session - in this case Trustee Koek - identify
the purpose of the executive session in the motion itself.
It is not appropriate for someone else who did not make the
motion to identify the executive session's purpose after the
motion has already been made and seconded. When asked to be
more specific as to the personnel matter to be discussed, the
mayor refuses. Case law has ruled that calling for an executive
session to discuss a blanket topic of 'personnel' does not satisfy
the requirements of the Open Meeting Law 105 (1) (f). The law
requires, with regard to personnel matters, that a motion describe
with detail the nature of the discussion. (Example: we will
discuss matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion,
demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of a
particular person). Trustee Koek claims that the board is not
required to be any more specific than making a blanket statement
that they are going into executive session to discuss "personnel".
The following is from an advisory opinion by Robert
Freeman, the Executive Director of the New York State Committee
on Open Government: (
Go to the Website )
Dear -------,
I have received your letter in which you raised
questions concerning the implementation of the Open Meetings
Law by the Board of Education of the Gilbertsville-Mt. Upton
School District.
The first involves the Board's practice of entering
into executive session to discuss "personnel matters."
When you have asked for greater specificity, the Board, according
to your letter, "refuses to answer."
In this regard, the Open Meetings Law requires
that a procedure be accomplished, during an open meeting, before
a public body may enter into an executive session. Specifically,
§105(1) states in relevant part that:
"Upon a majority vote of its total membership,
taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the
general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered,
a public body may conduct an executive session for the below
enumerated purposes only..."
As such, a motion to conduct an executive session
must include reference to the subject or subjects to be discussed,
and the motion must be carried by majority vote of a public
body's total membership before such a session may validly be
held. The ensuing provisions of §105(1) specify and limit
the subjects that may appropriately be considered during an
executive session. Therefore, a public body may not conduct
an executive session to discuss the subject of its choice.
Perhaps the most frequently cited ground for entry
into executive session is the so-called "personnel"
exception. Although it is used often, the word "personnel"
appears nowhere in the Open Meetings Law. While one of the grounds
for entry into executive session relates to personnel matters,
the language of that provision is precise. In its original form,
§105(1)(f) of the Open Meetings Law permitted a public
body to enter into an executive session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment
history of any person or corporation, or matters leading to
the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline,
suspension, dismissal or removal of any person or corporation..."
Under the language quoted above, public bodies
often convened executive sessions to discuss matters that dealt
with "personnel" generally, tangentially, or in relation
to policy concerns. However, the Committee consistently advised
that the provision was intended largely to protect privacy and
not to shield matters of policy under the guise of privacy.
To attempt to clarify the Law, the Committee recommended
a series of amendments to the Open Meetings Law, several of
which became effective on October 1, 1979. The recommendation
made by the Committee regarding §105(1)(f) was enacted
and now states that a public body may enter into an executive
session to discuss:
"...the medical, financial, credit or employment
history of a particular person or corporation, or matters leading
to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline,
suspension, dismissal or removal of a particular person or corporation..."
(emphasis added).
Based on the insertion of the term "particular"
in §105(1)(f), I believe that a discussion under that provision
may be considered in an executive session only when the subject
involves a particular person or persons, and only when one or
more of the topics listed in §105(1)(f) are considered.
Due to the presence of the term "particular"
in §105(1)(f), it has been advised that a motion describing
the subject to be discussed as "personnel" or as a
"personnel matter" is inadequate, and that the motion
should be based upon the specific language [emphasis added]
of §105(1)(f). For instance, a proper motion might
be: "I move to enter into an executive session to discuss
the employment history of a particular person (or persons)".
Such a motion would not in my opinion have to identify the person
or persons who may be the subject of a discussion. By means
of the kind of motion suggested above, members of a public body
and others in attendance would have the ability to know that
there is a proper basis for entry into an executive session.
Absent such detail, neither the members nor others may be able
to determine whether the subject may properly be considered
behind closed doors.
It is noted that the Appellate Division, Second
Department, recently confirmed the advice rendered by this office.
In discussing §105(1)(f) in relation to a matter involving
employment, the Court stated that:
"...the public body must identify the subject
matter to be discussed (See, Public Officers Law § 105
[1]), and it is apparent that this must be accomplished with
some degree of particularity, i.e., merely reciting the statutory
language is insufficient (see, Daily Gazette Co. v Town Bd.,
Town of Cobleskill, 111 Misc 2d 303, 304-305). Additionally,
the topics discussed during the executive session must remain
within the exceptions enumerated in the statute (see generally,
Matter of Plattsburgh Publ. Co., Div. of Ottaway Newspapers
v City of Plattsburgh, 185 AD2d §18), and these exceptions,
in turn, 'must be narrowly scrutinized, lest the article's clear
mandate be thwarted by thinly veiled references to the areas
delineated thereunder' (Weatherwax v Town of Stony Point, 97
AD2d 840, 841, quoting Daily Gazette Co. v Town Bd., Town of
Cobleskill, supra, at 304; see, Matter of Orange County Publs.,
Div. of Ottaway Newspapers v County of Orange, 120 AD2d 596,
lv dismissed 68 NY 2d 807).
"Applying these principles to the matter
before us, it is apparent that the Board's stated purpose for
entering into executive session, to wit, the discussion of a
'personnel issue', does not satisfy the requirements of Public
Officers Law § 105 (1) (f). The statute itself requires,
with respect to personnel matters, that the discussion involve
the 'employment history of a particular person" (id. [emphasis
supplied]). Although this does not mandate that the individual
in question be identified by name, it does require that any
motion to enter into executive session describe with some detail
the nature of the proposed discussion (see, State Comm on Open
Govt Adv Opn dated Apr. 6, 1993), and we reject respondents'
assertion that the Board's reference to a 'personnel issue'
is the functional equivalent of identifying 'a particular person'"
[Gordon v. Village of Monticello, ___ AD 2d ___ (December 29,
1994)].
Sincerely,
Robert J. Freeman
Executive Director
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